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BETWEEN A STONE AND A HARD PLACE:
HOW THE HAJJ CAN RESTORE THE SPIRIT OF
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION TO
TITLE VII
MATTHEW P. MOONEY†
ABSTRACT
Although section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires
that employers reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious
practices and beliefs, many commentators acknowledge that the spirit
of reasonable accommodation has not been realized because courts
have drastically limited the scope of employers’ duty. This may be
especially true for Muslims, who, according to a 2012 study, are
roughly half as likely to prevail in free-exercise and religiousaccommodation lawsuits as are non-Muslim claimants. One of the
central tenets of Islam, the hajj, poses significant challenges for
Muslim employees seeking accommodation under Title VII. Because
accommodating the hajj will almost always impose more than a de
minimis cost on employers, a court is unlikely to find that Title VII
requires employers to accommodate a Muslim employee’s decision to
complete the pilgrimage.
This Note attempts to articulate a new method for expanding Title
VII’s protection of employees’ religious beliefs and practices.
Specifically, this Note argues that increased involvement by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice
in hajj-accommodation cases offers a promising approach to
developing a more balanced accommodation doctrine, or at least to

Copyright © 2013 by Matthew P. Mooney.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; University of Virginia, B.A. 2010.
I am especially indebted to Joseph Blocher for his guidance and support throughout the writing
process and throughout my time here at Duke Law School. Thank you also to Samuel Buell for
his helpful feedback during the early stages of this piece. To the staff of the Duke Law Journal,
thank you for your editorial prowess, without which this Note would be in much rougher shape
than it stands today. To my parents, this acknowledgement cannot adequately express how
grateful I am for your love and support. Finally, to Hiba Hashmi, who inspired this topic and
who put up with me during the writing process, thank you for everything.

MOONEY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1030

1/17/2013 4:41 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1029

realigning the scales so that they are not tilted so heavily in favor of
employers. Despite clear precedent limiting an employer’s duty to
accommodate, increased intervention by the federal government in
Title VII hajj-accommodation cases has the potential to shift the
conception of reasonable accommodation. Though the government
must pick and choose the cases in which to intervene, hajjaccommodation cases present an opportunity to further the dual
purposes of the government’s Title VII enforcement authority to
implement the public interest as well as to bring about more effective
enforcement of private rights. Intervention can restore the spirit of
accommodation to section 701(j) and give employers more of an
incentive to accommodate their employees’ religious obligations.

INTRODUCTION
In August 2008, a Muslim schoolteacher named Safoorah Khan
approached her supervisor to request three weeks of unpaid leave so
1
that she could travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. This was not simply a
request for a vacation. Khan needed time off to complete the hajj, an
obligatory pilgrimage that all Muslims are expected to complete once
2
in their lifetime. The superintendent of her Berkeley, Illinois, school
district denied the request, explaining that the school could not afford
3
to lose its only math-lab instructor so close to state testing. In
response, Khan submitted a letter of resignation but continued to
4
teach until her scheduled departure for Mecca in December.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) found something troubling
about Khan’s story. In the eyes of the DOJ Civil Rights Division, the
school district’s denial of Khan’s request for unpaid leave “compelled
Ms. Khan to choose between her job and her religious beliefs, and
5
thus forced her discharge.” After Khan filed an employmentdiscrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the Berkeley
school district “to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil
1. Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. Backs Muslim Teacher, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2011, at A1.
2. Id.; see also infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
3. Markon, supra note 1. Khan had informed her school’s principal in the spring of 2008 of
her intention to complete the hajj in December of that year. She was told that “[a]ll she had to
do was submit her paperwork” to receive time off. Manya A. Brachear, Muslim’s Long
Pilgrimage Struggle, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2011, at 1.
4. Brachear, supra note 3.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Religious Discrimination
Lawsuit Against Berkeley School District in Illinois (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crt-1432.html.
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Rights Act of 1964.” Though the DOJ trumpeted the lawsuit as a
part of its “ongoing commitment to actively enforce federal
7
employment discrimination laws,” others were not convinced. A
former DOJ civil-rights official from the Bush administration called it
8
“a political lawsuit to placate Muslims.” Senator Lindsey Graham
9
described the “curious decision” to file suit as having gone “too far.”
Whatever the motivation for bringing the lawsuit, the
observation of former Attorney General Michael Mukasey was
perhaps the most damning. In a Washington Post article, Mukasey
opined that bringing the lawsuit was “a very dubious judgment and a
10
real legal reach.” This characterization may very well have been
accurate, but because the DOJ threw the weight of the federal
government against a small town of around five thousand people,
11
United States v. Board of Education (the Berkeley case) ultimately
settled without resolving the issue of whether Title VII required
12
accommodation.
Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers
to reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious practices and
beliefs unless such accommodation would impose an undue hardship
13
on employers. But, as many commentators acknowledge, “the spirit
14
of reasonable accommodation has not been realized” because courts

6. Complaint at 1, United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-07900 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
2010); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5.
8. Markon, supra note 1 (quoting Hans von Spakovsky) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
9. Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, Human Rights, & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 15–17
(2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/03/29/
National-Politics/Graphics/durbin_islam_transcript.pdf (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham).
10. Markon, supra note 1 (quoting Mukasey) (internal quotation mark omitted). It should
be noted that during the Bush administration, the EEOC filed a similar Title VII suit involving
a Muslim employee’s request for accommodation to complete the hajj. Consent Decree at 1,
EEOC v. S. Hills Med. Ctr., No. 3:07-cv-00976 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). As in the Berkeley
case, the employer denied the allegation but ultimately settled. Id.
11. United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-07900 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2010).
12. Consent Decree at 2–3, Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-7900. The parties waived any findings
of fact and conclusions of law on all issues. Id. at 3.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
14. Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It Reasonable
to the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002); see also Karen Engle, The
Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision To Redeem
Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 431 (1997) (“The religious accommodation advocates know all
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have defined undue hardship at a threshold of “more than a de
15
minimis cost.” Rather than ensuring that employees are not forced
to choose between their jobs and their religion, courts’ interpretation
of section 701(j) has instead allowed employers to deny employees
16
relief. This may be especially true for Muslims: according to a 2012
study, non-Muslims are twice as likely as Muslims to prevail in free17
exercise and religious-accommodation lawsuits. And because
accommodating the hajj will almost always impose more than a de
minimis cost on employers, a court is unlikely to find that Title VII
requires employers to accommodate a Muslim employee’s decision to
complete the pilgrimage. Although a federal judge has never issued
an opinion in a Title VII case in which a Muslim employee sought
18
accommodation to complete the hajj, there is reason to believe that
19
a plaintiff in such a case would lose on the merits.
That a Muslim employee would likely lose a hajj-accommodation
case is particularly unsettling because the hajj is a central tenet of
Islam. And although this Note does not advocate that the centrality of
20
a belief is—or should be—relevant to the Title VII analysis, it does
seem that a law requiring employers to accommodate religious
too well that the doctrine has not ‘worked’ for them.”); Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure
To Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an
Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 585 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has thereby
interpreted § 701(j) in a manner that is clearly at odds with its purpose.”); Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J.
1, 6 (1996) (“[Title VII’s] seemingly broad definition of religion received a surprisingly narrow
interpretation . . . .”).
15. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
16. Engle, supra note 14, at 388.
17. Non-Muslim claimants succeed in presenting a free-exercise or religiousaccommodation claim in 38 percent of cases, compared to 22 percent for Muslims. Gregory C.
Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence
from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 251 (2012). The difference in likelihood of
success between Muslims and non-Muslims in Title VII cases may be under- or overstated
because the dataset used in this article is not limited to Title VII cases. See id. at 236 (explaining
that several types of cases were used in the study).
18. A WestlawNext search with the query “hajj & accommodat!” run on January 4, 2013,
returned thirty-eight cases, none of which involved a Title VII claim for accommodation. A
search with the query “hajj & Title VII” returned fifteen cases, none of which involved a
religious-accommodation claim under section 701(j).
19. See infra Part III.
20. Granting enhanced protection for central tenets of a faith would almost certainly be
unconstitutional. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker
more correctly perceived the commands of their . . . faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.”).
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practices should protect the central tenets of a religion. Commentary
21
on Title VII’s failure to protect religious minorities is not new; to
address this failure, many commentators suggest that the solution
22
should come through legislative amendment to Title VII or through
23
Supreme Court action. Yet Congress has considered legislation
aimed at undoing the Court’s interpretation of section 701(j) in every
legislative session since 1994 without a single bill making it out of
24
committee. Similarly, the Court has not overturned its own
precedent regarding the duty to accommodate religious observance.
Therefore, if the spirit of reasonable accommodation is to be
restored, it will have to be done another way.
This Note attempts to articulate a new method for expanding
Title VII’s protection of religious beliefs and practices and for
balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests of employers and
employees. Specifically, this Note argues that increased involvement
in hajj-accommodation cases by the EEOC and the DOJ is a
promising mechanism for developing a more balanced
accommodation doctrine, one that realigns the scales so that they are
not tilted as heavily in favor of employers. Despite precedent limiting
employers’ duty to accommodate, increased intervention by the
EEOC and the DOJ in Title VII hajj-accommodation cases has the
potential to shift the conception of what constitutes reasonable
25
accommodation. Moreover, by restoring the spirit of section 701(j)
such that Title VII has some bite, employers will have more of an
incentive to accommodate their employees’ religious obligations in
the first instance and thus avert a potential lawsuit. Though the
government must pick and choose the cases in which to intervene,
hajj-accommodation cases present the opportunity to further the dual

21. See generally Brierton, supra note 14 (arguing that Title VII does not provide adequate
accommodations for religious employees); Kaminer, supra note 14 (same); Sonny Franklin
Miller, Note, Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L.
789 (1997) (same).
22. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 14, at 629 (“This article proposes that § 701(j) be
amended . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How
Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(j), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 522
(“[C]ourts should require employers to accommodate all religious practices deemed ‘central’ to
the employee’s faith, unless accommodation of those practices would result in an undue (i.e.,
significant) hardship to the employer.”).
24. See infra notes 219–223 and accompanying text.
25. This Note uses intervention and involvement interchangeably to mean government
participation in Title VII litigation between an employer and an individual employee.
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purposes of its Title VII enforcement power “to implement the public
interest” and “to bring about more effective enforcement of private
26
rights.”
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief
description of Islam and the hajj to give context to the rest of the
analysis. Parts II and III assess the likelihood that a Muslim employee
who wishes to complete the hajj would succeed on the merits of a
Title VII claim alleging failure to reasonably accommodate. Part II.A
discusses the history of section 701(j) and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the duty to accommodate an employee’s religious
practice. Part II.B describes various ways that an employer can avoid
providing accommodation for an employee under current Title VII
jurisprudence. Part III applies the analysis of the previous Part to
explain why Muslims will almost never be able to mount a successful
claim of religious discrimination based on an employer’s failure to
accommodate the hajj. Finally, Part IV argues that the federal
government’s intervention in hajj-accommodation cases will lead to
increased protection and accommodation for Muslims as well as for
religious employees generally by creating a more robust and balanced
Title VII framework of reasonable accommodation.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM AND ITS PRACTICES
There are 2.6 million Muslims living in the United States as of
27
2010, and that number is projected to increase to 6.3 million by 2030.
This increase will be fueled in part by a rise in Muslim immigration,
28
which has increased steadily since the 1990s, but there will also be a
29
noticeable change as the population of native-born Muslims grows.
Despite America’s burgeoning and increasingly native-born Muslim
30
population, Islam remains largely misunderstood, perhaps in part
because of media reports that tend to “misrepresent not only the
details of the Islamic system . . . but also the fundamental concepts

26. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
27. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, THE FUTURE OF THE
GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: PROJECTIONS FOR 2010–2030, at 15 (2011).
28. Id. at 147.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Nearly 60 percent of Americans admit to having little to no knowledge of Islamic
practices. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BENEDICT XVI VIEWED
FAVORABLY BUT FAULTED ON RELIGIOUS OUTREACH: PUBLIC EXPRESSES MIXED VIEWS OF
ISLAM, MORMONISM 1 (2007).
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and teachings of the religion.” To contextualize the forthcoming
discussion, this Part provides background on Islam’s major tenets,
with a particular emphasis on the hajj.
Although 70 percent of Americans believe that Islam is “very
32
different” from their own religion, the truth is that Islam shares
33
substantial similarities with other major Western faiths. Like
Christianity and Judaism, Islam is rooted in the Abrahamic
34
35
tradition. The Qur’an references Christianity and Judaism and
36
endorses many of the teachings of those faiths.
Central to Islamic faith are various obligatory acts of worship,
called ibadat, which are often referred to as the “Five Pillars of
37
Islam.” The ibadat consists of (1) the declaration of faith, shahadah;
(2) the five prescribed daily prayers, salah; (3) fasting during the
Islamic month of Ramadan, sawm; (4) giving a portion of one’s
disposable income to those in need, zakah; and (5) the pilgrimage to
38
Mecca, hajj. Each act is prescribed by the Qur’an, and is obligatory
39
for all Muslims, regardless of where they may live.
The obligation to complete the hajj is found directly in Al’Imran, the third sura of the Qur’an:

31. SUZANNE HANEEF, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ISLAM AND MUSLIMS,
at ix (14th ed. 1996). In fact, a 2007 poll found that “[t]he biggest influence on the public’s
impressions of Muslims, particularly among those who express an unfavorable opinion of
Muslims, is what people hear and read in the media.” PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE &
THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 4–5.
32. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 1.
33. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 195; see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT
PATH, at xii (4th ed. 2011) (“Media images of Islam have often obscured the fact that Muslims,
Jews, and Christians share much in common . . . .”).
34. See HANEEF, supra note 31, at 196 (“Abraham symbolizes the unity of this belief [in
the Oneness of God] from which issued forth Judaism, Christianity and Islam.”).
35. The Qur’an is the holy scripture of the Islamic faith, which Muslims believe was
revealed to the Prophet Mohammed between 610 and 632 AD. Id. at 20.
36. See, e.g., THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 5:69 (Abdullah
Yusuf Ali trans., Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an 2008) (“Those who believe (in the Qur-án), those who
follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians,—any who believe in God and
the Last Day, and work righteousness—on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.”
(footnote omitted)). Of course, there are fundamental differences between the faiths as well.
For example, Muslims and Jews do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, though Muslims
do recognize that Jesus was a “prophet in the line of the other prophets raised among the
Children of Israel.” HANEEF, supra note 31, at 202.
37. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. For a description of the details of each of these practices, see generally id. at 51–70.
39. Id. at 50.
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The first house (of worship) appointed for men was that at
Bakka: full of blessing and of guidance for all kinds of beings.
In it are signs manifest; (for example), the Station of Abraham;
whoever enters it attains security; pilgrimage thereto is a duty men
40
owe to God,—those who can afford the journey . . . .

The Qur’an imposes this duty upon all Muslims, but because the
41
cost of completing the hajj is substantial, an exception is made for
42
those who are unable to afford it. Those who are physically unable
43
to participate in the hajj are similarly exempted from the obligation.
Each year, more than two million Muslims travel to Mecca, Saudi
44
Arabia, to perform the hajj. The pilgrimage occurs each year from
the eighth through the thirteenth day of Dhu Al-Hijjah, the twelfth
45
month of the Islamic calendar. Dressed in white cloth, called ihram,
Muslims participating in the hajj spend specified moments in Mecca
46
and certain locations nearby performing obligatory rites. The central
ritual of the hajj is the circumambulation of the Ka’bah, the House of
47
God. A black stone located in the eastern corner of the Ka’bah is
said to have been delivered by an angel to Abraham as he built the

40. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 3:96–97
(footnotes omitted).
41. There are travel agencies dedicated to providing a range of services for Muslims to
complete the hajj. See, e.g., DAR EL SALAM, http://www.darelsalam.com (last visited Jan. 16,
2012) (offering hajj travel packages that can cost up to $16,900).
42. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 3:97; see also
Hajj, ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA, http://www.saudiembassy.net/issues/hajj (last visited
Jan. 16, 2012) (“The emphasis on financial ability is meant to ensure that a Muslim takes care of
his family first.”).
43. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 2:196. One
could argue that Islam itself provides reasonable accommodation by exempting Muslims from
the obligation to complete the hajj in certain situations. But if an employee claims to have a
sincerely held religious belief that they must complete the hajj, it is not a court’s place to
question the validity of that belief. See Engle, supra note 14, at 386 (“[T]he Guidelines[, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1605 (1996),] on religious accommodation allow for self-definition regarding both
belief and observance. That one is required to be sincere in that definition is the only
limitation.”).
44. David Clingingsmith, Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Michael Kremer, Estimating the Impact of
the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1133, 1134 (2009).
45. Hajj, supra note 42. Because the Islamic calendar is based on the lunar calendar, the
hajj begins ten or eleven days earlier in the Gregorian calendar than it did the year before.
JUAN E. CAMPO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 124 (J. Gordon Melton & Juan E. Campo eds.,
2009).
46. REEM AL FAISAL & SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, HAJJ 87 (2009).
47. Id.
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Ka’bah on top of the base of the original temple built by Adam. The
Black Stone “is the holiest object in the Holy Sanctuary and every
49
pilgrim seeks to touch and kiss it.” The practice has continued for
more than 1,400 years, with Muslims traveling from all parts of the
50
globe to perform the sacred and obligatory rite. After participating
in the hajj, some Muslims choose to add the honorific title Hajji
51
before their name to signify their completion of the pilgrimage.
Many describe the hajj as “the most significant religious event in their
52
lives.”
In countries where Islam is the majority religion, such as
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, Islamic obligations are relatively easy to
accommodate. For instance, Friday is a holiday rather than Sunday in
order to facilitate the weekly congregational worship salah al53
jummah, which occurs on Friday afternoon. Because Islam is a
minority religion in the United States, however, such
accommodations are not readily available as a matter of course.
Therefore, Muslims who wish to practice the central tenets of their
faith must ask their employers for special accommodations, and those
54
requests are often refused. These refusals may be attributable to a
55
lack of knowledge about the practices of Islam, the fact that
accommodating Muslims can be “more difficult and costly than
56
accommodating other religions,” or, more likely, it could be some
combination of the two.
Muslim employees will face a particularly difficult challenge
when they seek accommodation to complete the hajj. The hajj
requires an extended absence from work and can only be performed
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id.
50. Id. at xiii.
51. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 113.
52. Clingingsmith et al., supra note 44, at 1139. For a more thorough account of events that
occur during the hajj, see generally AL FAISAL & NASR, supra note 46, at 87–89.
53. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 143.
54. Not only do employers often refuse to accommodate, but their decisions are often
upheld in court. See, e.g., Khan v. Fed. Reserve Bank, No. 02 Civ.8893(JCF), 2005 WL 273027,
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2005) (granting summary judgment in favor of an employer who
refused to accommodate a Muslim employee’s request to alter her work schedule during the
month of Ramadan so that she could work through lunch); Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., No.
98-CV-4061 (JG), 2001 WL 1152815, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001), aff’d, 318 F.3d 130 (2d
Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment in favor of an employer who refused to accommodate a
Muslim employee’s request for accommodation so that he could attend salah al-jumah).
55. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
56. Zaheer, supra note 23, at 504.
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at one specific time each year. Thus employers will have fewer
options for accommodating their employees. If an employer refuses
to accommodate, the Muslim employee must wait an entire year to
perform the hajj, and it is not guaranteed that circumstances would
change such that the employer will be more accommodating the next
year. Given the profound importance of the pilgrimage, American
Muslims are likely to have a strong interest in participating in the hajj
at the specific time that they decide is right for them. The question is
how much control an employer should have over a Muslim
employee’s decision to complete the pilgrimage in a given year. The
next Part analyzes employers’ duty to provide reasonable
accommodation when a religious practice conflicts with an
employment obligation.
II. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE VII
Although Title VII guarantees reasonable accommodation of
religious beliefs and observances, judicial decisions have narrowed
the scope of that guarantee, leaving employees of all faiths with a
largely empty promise. To understand why a Muslim who wishes to
complete the hajj is nearly certain to lose in a Title VII religiousaccommodation case, one must first appreciate the history of section
701(j) and how courts’ interpretations of that section have affected
the scope of an employer’s duty to accommodate.
A. The Tension Within Title VII: Congress’s Intent and the Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of the Duty To Accommodate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
57
origin.” Notably, however, the original act did not define the term
58
“religion.” The act also failed to clarify whether Title VII included
an affirmative duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs

57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also established the EEOC, which
was charged with effectuating the “purposes and policies” of Title VII. Id. § 705, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4.
58. See id. § 701 (failing to define the term “religion”).
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and practices. In 1972, however, Congress specifically amended Title
VII to impose a duty to accommodate, but it did so “rather
60
awkwardly” by incorporating the duty into a definition of religion.
Specifically, Congress defined “religion” to include “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
61
business.”
Though the floor debate on the proposed amendment was
62
short, section 701(j)’s primary purpose was to ensure that employers
would accommodate employees who strictly observe the Sabbath on
63
days other than Sunday.
Senator Jennings Randolph, the
amendment’s sponsor and a practicing Seventh Day Baptist,
expressed a concern that “there are certain faiths that are having a
very difficult time” convincing employers to “adjust work schedules
64
to fit the requirements of the faith of some of their workers.”
Although Sabbatarians were the intended beneficiaries of the
amendment, Senator Randolph suggested in a colloquy with Senator
Hoyt Dominick that the provision would also extend to “other
religious sect[s] which [have] a different method of conducting their
65
lives than do most Americans.”

59. See Brierton, supra note 14, at 167 n.14 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “did
not specifically mandate ‘reasonable accommodation’”). Although the EEOC promulgated
guidelines that imposed such a duty, “most courts chose not to follow the EEOC Guidelines”
and instead “determin[ed] that failure to accommodate . . . should not be equated with religious
discrimination.” Kaminer, supra note 14, at 582.
60. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 580.
61. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2, § 701(j), 86
Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
62. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977) (“The legislative
history of the measure consists chiefly of a brief floor debate in the Senate, contained in less
than two pages of the Congressional Record and consisting principally of the views of the
proponent of the measure, Senator Jennings Randolph.”).
63. See 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph) (“[T]here has
been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire or to continue in employment
employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to abstain from work . . . on particular
days.”); see also Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The primary purpose of the
amendment . . . was to protect Saturday Sabbatarians . . . .”).
64. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph).
65. Id. at 706 (statement of Sen. Hoyt Dominick). Neither Senator Randolph nor Senator
Dominick explicated which faiths they were referring to during this floor debate, but it is
doubtful that they had Muslims and the hajj in mind. Nevertheless, “statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil” that the statute was designed to remedy—in this case employers’
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Of course, section 701(j) was not designed to anticipate and
resolve every conflict between employment duties and religious
practices. But the amendment reflected a belief that “insofar as
possible, the law flowing from the original Constitution of the United
States should protect . . . religious freedom, and hopefully [one’s]
opportunity to earn a livelihood within the American system, which
has become . . . more pluralistic and more industrialized through the
66
years.” Senator Randolph assumed that the language of section
701(j) was sufficient to protect most religious observances and that
only “a very, very small percentage of cases” would actually present
67
an undue hardship sufficient to justify nonaccommodation. There
would be “gray areas,” but Senator Randolph argued that these
uncertainties “should not deter the Senate in its action” to approve
68
the amendment.
These gray areas became very important, however, when the
Supreme Court was confronted with the task of interpreting the scope
69
of section 701(j) in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison. In the
Court’s view, it was clear that employers had a statutory obligation to
provide reasonable accommodations for religious employees, but the
reach of that obligation had not been clearly spelled out by Congress
70
or by the EEOC. Thus, the Court was left to fill in the gaps, which it
did by severely limiting employers’ duty to accommodate their
employees.
In Hardison, an employee who was a member of the Worldwide
Church of God requested Saturdays off from work to observe the
71
Sabbath. Like Seventh Day Baptists, one of the tenets of the
Worldwide Church of God is that its members must refrain from
performing any work from sunset on Friday until sunset on

unwillingness to provide time off for Sabbatarians—to cover other “reasonably comparable
evils.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
66. 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph). Some
commentators have argued that Senator Randolph’s “desire to give private employees the same
protection granted under the Constitution to public employees . . . might seem a little odd”
because “even at the time of his amendment, free exercise accommodation claims were not
faring well in courts.” Engle, supra note 14, at 371; see also id. at 362 n.174 (discussing pre-1972
cases in which courts were reluctant to hold that the Free Exercise Clause requires employers to
accommodate their employees).
67. 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph).
68. Id.
69. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id. at 67–68.
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72

Saturday. Trans World Airlines (TWA), the employer, agreed to
permit the union to seek a change of work assignment for Hardison,
73
but the union was unwilling to do so. To further accommodate
Hardison, TWA would have been forced to (1) leave Hardison’s
position unfilled, which would have impaired critical airline
operations, (2) fill his position with another employee, which would
have undermanned another position, or (3) employ someone not
regularly assigned to work on Saturdays, which would have required
74
TWA to pay premium wages. TWA refused to make any of these
75
accommodations. When Hardison did not report for work on
76
Saturdays, he was discharged for insubordination.
Hardison filed suit against TWA, claiming that his discharge
77
constituted religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. The
district court ruled in favor of TWA, finding that the airline had made
reasonable accommodations and that any additional accommodation
78
would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. The Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that TWA breached its duty to provide
reasonable accommodation to Hardison’s religious needs and
79
therefore was liable for religious discrimination.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit “in all
80
relevant respects.” The Court was “convinced . . . that TWA itself
[could not] be faulted for having failed to work out a shift or job swap
for Hardison” because any unilateral swap would have violated the
81
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the
proposed alternative accommodations “would involve costs to TWA,

72. Id. at 67.
73. Id. at 68. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement with TWA, the union allocated
shifts based on seniority. Id. The union would not violate the seniority provisions of the
agreement, and Hardison had insufficient seniority to switch shifts. Id.
74. Id. at 68–69.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 69. Hardison also filed suit against the union, but the district court ruled that the
union was not obligated to ignore its seniority system. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment regarding the union because Hardison did not appear to raise the issue on appeal. Id.
at 70.
78. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev’d,
527 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
79. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 44 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S.
63 (1977).
80. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 77.
81. Id. at 78–79.

MOONEY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1042

1/17/2013 4:41 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1029
82

either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages.”
This cost, the Court determined, was too much to ask of an employer:
“To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
83
give Hardison Saturdays off [was] an undue hardship.” Thus, TWA
84
was not obligated to accommodate Hardison’s religious observance.
In a blistering dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court’s
definition of undue hardship was strained, stating that “[a]s a matter
of law, I seriously question whether simple English usage permits
‘undue hardship’ to be interpreted to mean ‘more than de minimis
85
cost.’” He further observed that, even under the majority’s
definition, “[t]o conclude that TWA, one of the largest air carriers in
the Nation, would have suffered undue hardship . . . defies both
86
reason and common sense.” Justice Marshall concluded with a
mournful assessment of the implications of the majority’s holding on
the future of Title VII:
What makes today’s decision most tragic, however, is not that
respondent Hardison has been needlessly deprived of his livelihood
simply because he chose to follow the dictates of his conscience. Nor
is the tragedy exhausted by the impact it will have on thousands of
Americans like Hardison who could be forced to live on welfare as
the price they must pay for worshiping their God. The ultimate
tragedy is that, despite Congress’ best efforts, one of this Nation’s
pillars of strength—our hospitality to religious diversity—has been
seriously eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer until today’s
87
decision is erased.

Many commentators have sympathized with Justice Marshall’s
dissent, arguing that the Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship”
88
in Hardison is contrary to both the plain meaning of the term and
89
the spirit of section 701(j). The fact remains, however, that the Court
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 84–85.
85. Id. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 84 (majority opinion)).
86. Id. at 91; see also id. at 92 n.6 (noting that TWA would have been forced to pay “$150
for three months, at which time [Hardison] would have been eligible to transfer”).
87. Id. at 96–97 (footnote omitted).
88. See, e.g., Zaheer, supra note 23, at 515 (“[I]t appears that only for religious
accommodations has the Court interpreted ‘undue hardship’ in a manner at odds with its
ordinary meaning . . . .”).
89. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 14, at 388 (“Far from preventing employees from having to
choose between their religion and their jobs, as Senator Randolph had hoped, the latter part of
section 701(j) has been used over and over to deny plaintiffs relief.”).
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has not seen the need to reevaluate Hardison’s interpretation of
undue hardship, nor has Congress legislatively overridden the Court’s
holding. Thus, Hardison remains the law.
B. The Empty Promise of Section 701(j): Avoiding Accommodation
After Hardison
The Court’s decision in Hardison “tipped the balance in favor of
90
the employer in determining what is a reasonable accommodation,”
thus making it exceedingly difficult for religious employees to prevail
in Title VII claims. But the limitations on an employer’s duty to
accommodate did not end with Hardison. Subsequent cases decided
by the Supreme Court and lower courts have further narrowed the
scope of section 701(j), which has ultimately led to less
accommodation of religious practice and observance. This Section
discusses those limitations.
Before employees may bring a Title VII claim, there are a series
of procedural requirements that they must satisfy. First, an employee
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, at which point
the EEOC will investigate to see whether there is probable cause to
91
believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the
EEOC determines that there is probable cause, it will meet with the
employer and the employee to attempt to resolve the conflict through
92
informal methods. If conciliation is unsuccessful, the EEOC has
three options: it may itself initiate a civil action against a private
employer, it may authorize the aggrieved party to file a claim against
the employer by issuing a notice of the right-to-sue, or, if the
employer is a state or local government entity, the EEOC may refer
the matter to the DOJ with a recommendation that the Attorney
93
General file suit against the government entity. These procedural
hurdles protect employers from being forced to defend employment

90. Brierton, supra note 14, at 192.
91. For details on the EEOC’s investigative authority and procedure, see generally 29
C.F.R. §§ 1601.15–1601.17 (2012).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
93. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In cases in which the EEOC or the Attorney General files charges
against the employer, the aggrieved employee is not precluded from joining the suit. Id. If the
EEOC or the Attorney General files a complaint against an employer, the aggrieved party may
not initiate a separate action against the employer. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
177 F.3d 448, 466 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile Title VII affords recovery through private action or
an action by the EEOC, it does not allow both . . . .”).
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94

actions that occurred long ago, but they also risk silencing legitimate
95
claims. Once employees satisfy the procedural prerequisites,
employees must still prevail on the merits of their claim.
The prima facie case for a Title VII accommodation claim
consists of three elements: (1) the employee had a bona fide religious
belief that conflicted with an employment duty, (2) the employee
provided notice to the employer of the conflict, and (3) the employee
96
was disciplined for failing to comply with the employment duty.
Because the second and third elements are relatively
97
unobjectionable, this Note focuses only on the conflict between an
employee’s religious belief and employment duties. Once the plaintiff
establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that it made good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the
98
employee’s religious belief or that any accommodation would have
99
imposed an undue hardship on the employer. After Hardison and
subsequent decisions, employers can provide poor accommodation—
or even deny accommodation outright—without being held liable for
violating Title VII.
1. The Plaintiff’s Burden and Reasonable Accommodation.
Courts are understandably uncomfortable with the prospect of
questioning whether an employee’s belief is in fact religiously
100
based, and thus “the claim of [an individual] that his belief is an

94. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980).
95. See 156 CONG. REC. S10,517 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. John Kerry)
(“There is no way to tell how many people simply quit their job rather than complain.”).
96. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 60
(1986); accord Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Brown v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979).
97. The second element is reasonable because an employer needs notice of a potential
conflict in order to make accommodations. The third element ensures that the plaintiff has
standing to bring the case in the first place. Of course, the injury requirement could also lead to
an underreporting of discrimination, because employees may sit in silence and comply with the
employment duty that is contrary to their religious belief rather than risk losing both their job
and a subsequent lawsuit.
98. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (“[A]n employer has met
its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable
accommodation to the employee.”).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
100. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”).
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101

essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight.” That
is not to say, however, that courts will never look to ensure that the
employee holds a bona fide religious belief, as the Ninth Circuit
102
demonstrated in Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. In that
case, a Roman Catholic employee requested unpaid leave after she
learned of a pilgrimage opportunity to the former Yugoslavia to
103
witness visions of the Virgin Mary. When her employer denied the
request, the employee went on the pilgrimage anyway and filed a
104
Title VII claim after she was discharged. During the trial, Tiano
testified, “I felt I was called to go [on the pilgrimage]. . . . I felt that
from deep in my heart that I was called. I had to be there at that
105
time.” The Ninth Circuit found this “lone unilateral statement” to
be insufficient evidence of a “temporal mandate” to her religious
106
belief. Because Tiano failed to present corroborating evidence, the
court found that the timing of the pilgrimage was a matter of personal
preference and ruled that Tiano failed to establish a prima facie case
107
of religious discrimination. Specifically, the court held that “where
an employee maintains that her religious beliefs require her to attend
a particular pilgrimage, she must prove that the temporal mandate
108
was part of the bona fide religious belief.” Otherwise, the court

101. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). That is not to say that the inquiry
concludes when plaintiffs claim that they hold a religious belief. Rather than focusing on
whether the belief is truly a religious belief, the courts have instead focused on whether the
claimed religious belief is sincerely held. See id. at 185 (“[T]he threshold question of
sincerity . . . must be resolved in every case.”). Though Seeger dealt with exemption from the
military draft, id. at 164–65, its logic has been applied in Title VII cases, see, e.g., Redmond v.
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We believe the proper test to be applied to
the determination of what is ‘religious’ under § 2000e(j) can be derived from the Supreme Court
decisions in Welsh v. United States, [398 U.S. 333 (1970)], and United States v. Seeger . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
102. Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 1998).
103. Id. at 680.
104. Id. at 680–81.
105. Id. at 680 (emphasis added) (quoting Mary Tiano) (internal quotation mark omitted).
106. Id. at 682 (“For example, she did not testify that the visions of the Virgin Mary were
expected to be more intense during that period. Nor did she suggest that the Catholic Church
advocated her attendance at that particular pilgrimage.”).
107. Id. at 683.
108. Id. at 682. Recall, however, that courts are fairly deferential to a party’s
characterization of a particular belief as religious. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying
text. Thus, Tiano may be appropriately characterized as a case of inadequate proof. Had Tiano
presented proof of a sincerely held religious belief, the Ninth Circuit presumably would not
have granted summary judgment.
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reasoned, employers might be “forced to accommodate the personal
109
preferences of the employee.”
Other courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have cited Tiano with
110
approval, with one court explaining that “[an] employee’s desire to
make [a] pilgrimage, which could be made at any time, at a time of
her own choosing is a matter of personal preference” and thus is not
111
entitled to Title VII protection. Although Title VII “leaves little
room for a party to challenge the religious nature of an employee’s
112
professed beliefs,” these cases demonstrate that employers are not
precluded from doing so and that such tactics can be successful.
In addition to requiring a bona fide religious belief, an
113
employee’s belief must actually conflict with an employment duty.
Thus, when an employer presents a reasonable accommodation that
114
eliminates the conflict, the Title VII inquiry is at an end. As the
Supreme Court articulated in Ansonia Board of Education v.
115
Philbrook, “By its very terms [Title VII] directs that any reasonable
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its
116
accommodation obligation.” Employers are not required to accept
an employee’s preferred accommodation, nor are they required to
show that the alternatives proposed by an employee would impose
more of an undue hardship than the employer’s chosen method of
117
accommodation. The accommodation need only be reasonable.
109. Id.
110. E.g., Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2001); Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody,
G.P., 719 F. Supp. 2d 918, 929 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Loftus v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,
No. 08-13397, 2010 WL 1139338 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2010); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194
F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n v. Gemini
Aluminum Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 911 (Ct. App. 2004) (“We have found no other
published opinion relating to religious discrimination in which the expression, ‘temporal
mandate,’ appears.”).
111. Jiglov, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
112. EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de
Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002).
113. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 60
(1986).
114. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986). For an accommodation to be
reasonable, however, it must actually “eliminate[] the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices.” Id. at 70. Lower courts “generally refuse” to find an
accommodation reasonable if that accommodation could not possibly eliminate the conflict.
Kaminer, supra note 14, at 605.
115. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
116. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 69; see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982)
(“Although the statutory burden to accommodate rests with the employer, the employee has a
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Lower courts are generally in agreement that voluntary shift
swaps within a neutral rotating shift system are a reasonable method
118
of accommodating a religious employee, even if there are no
119
employees who are willing to swap shifts. The Tenth Circuit
succinctly articulated a rationale for this stance, stating:
[A]n employer [has] done all that was reasonably required under
[Title VII] once it [has] encouraged the employee to try to find
another employee to swap shifts with him so that he could avoid
working . . . in violation of his religious beliefs. . . . [I]t would [be]
unreasonable to require the employer to go further and attempt to
arrange a schedule swap for the plaintiff. We recognize[] the
interactive and reciprocal duties inherent in a reasonableness
analysis, and conclude[] that the employer had done all that was
reasonably required of it when it was amenable to, and receptive to,
efforts that the employee could have conducted for himself to
120
arrange his own schedule swap.

Furthermore, a proposed accommodation is not unreasonable
121
simply because it requires an employee to bear some economic cost.
In Philbrook, for instance, the Supreme Court held that unpaid leave
is a reasonable accommodation because “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid
leave] is merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at
122
work.” Similarly, an employer can propose that employees use their
123
vacation days for religious observance, though some courts have
correlative duty to make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the
employer.”).
118. See, e.g., Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“Numerous courts have relied on Hardison in holding that similar authorizations of voluntary
swaps instituted by employers within neutral rotating shift systems constitute reasonable
accommodations under Title VII.”).
119. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 605.
120. Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000).
121. See Kaminer, supra note 14, at 606 (“The courts agree that a reasonable
accommodation can require an employee to bear some economic cost.”).
122. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70–71 (alteration in original) (quoting Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 145 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Marshall argued that
the majority’s distinction was a false one because unpaid leave is a “forced reduction in
compensation based on an employee’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
123. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1379 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We recognize
that use of vacation time legitimately may be required to allow an employee to avoid work on
religious holidays or, in combination with other methods, to allow an employee to regularly
avoid working on the Sabbath.”); Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that Title VII does not require that an employee be able to “have her religious holidays and
keep her vacation days as well”).
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held that requiring an employee to use all of their vacation days is
124
Employers can also satisfy their obligation by
unreasonable.
offering to transfer the employee to another position, so long as the
125
new position preserves the employee’s employment status. If the
trier of fact finds that the new position fails to sufficiently preserve
the “compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,”
126
then an employee’s Title VII claim may proceed. The fact that the
127
new position is less desirable is not dispositive, at least in part
because “[i]t is difficult for any organization to accommodate
128
employees who are choosy about assignments.”
2. The Employer’s Burden and Undue Hardship. As noted in
Section B.1, a court will inquire into whether an accommodation
results in undue hardship for an employer only after the court finds
that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
129
religious beliefs or practices. Even then, however, the religious
employee has an uphill battle because lower courts have interpreted
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardison to require “a minimal level
130
of accommodation.” Indeed, shortly after Hardison was decided,
the Ninth Circuit recognized that “a standard less difficult to satisfy
than the [de minimis] standard for demonstrating undue hardship
131
expressed in Hardison is difficult to imagine.”

124. See, e.g., Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379 (“[The employee] was faced with the choice of
working on the Sabbath or potentially using all of her accrued vacation to avoid doing
so. . . . Such an employee stands to lose a benefit, vacation time, enjoyed by all other employees
who do not share the same religious conflict, and is thus discriminated against with respect to a
privilege of employment.”).
125. See, e.g., Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer
reasonably accommodated an employee by inviting the employee to bid for another “essentially
equivalent” position with requirements that did not interfere with the employee’s religious
belief); Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776–77 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he inquiry under Title VII reduces to whether the accommodation reasonably
preserves the affected employee’s employment status.”).
126. Kelly v. Cnty. of Orange, 101 F. App’x 206, 207 (9th Cir. 2004).
127. See Ayele v. Allright Bos. Parking, Inc., No. 99-1044, 1999 WL 1319012, at *1 (1st Cir.
Oct. 13, 1999) (“To be reasonable the accommodation, as the district court explained, need not
measure up to plaintiff’s preferences, but it must be sufficiently comparable to the original
position to amount to a reasonable alternative.”); Wright, 2 F.3d at 217 (“A much more
searching inquiry might also be necessary if Wright, in order to accommodate his religious
practices, had to accept a reduction in pay or some other loss of benefits.”).
128. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1991).
129. See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text.
130. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 610.
131. Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Post-Hardison, lower courts have consistently affirmed that the
inquiry into whether a proposed accommodation imposes an undue
132
burden is fact-driven and case-specific. Furthermore, an employer
must demonstrate actual hardship, not merely hypothetical or
133
speculative hardship. If courts were to consider anticipated hardship
or the hardship that would be incurred if multiple employees
requested the same accommodation, any proposed accommodation
134
could be calculated to reach the level of undue hardship, which
135
“would essentially render section 701(j) meaningless.” Employers
are not required, however, to actually implement an accommodation
136
to prove undue hardship.
As Hardison demonstrates, employers are not required to bear
significant economic or efficiency costs in order to accommodate a
137
religious employee. Many plaintiffs continue to lose Title VII cases
because the court finds that accommodating the religious observance
138
would either impose more than a de minimis economic cost or
139
decrease productivity. Courts also agree that an employer is not
132. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he precise
reach of the employer’s obligation to its employee is unclear . . . and must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.” (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592
(11th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
133. See Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n employer’s costs of
accommodation ‘must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished from anticipated or
multiplied hardship.’” (quoting Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979)));
Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Any proffered hardship,
however, must be actual . . . .”).
134. Brown, 601 F.2d at 961.
135. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 611.
136. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76–81 (1977) (finding that the
proposed accommodations would impose undue hardship despite the fact that none of the
accommodations were implemented); Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 519 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“[A]n employer does not have to actually experience the hardship in order for the
hardship to be recognized as too great to be reasonable.”).
137. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. Whether or not the financial cost at stake in Hardison was
significant is a matter of debate; it would have cost TWA $150 for three months to
accommodate Hardison. Id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that an employee’s proposal that his employer hire an additional driver to cover the employee’s
shifts “would result in a significant additional cost” and would “impose more than a de minimis
cost”); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he hiring of an
additional worker . . . would have entailed more than a de minimis cost, relieving [the employer]
of the obligation to accommodate.”).
139. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]llowing [an
employee] to direct [another] employee to type his Bible study notes would amount to an undue
hardship on the conduct of county business, since the work that that employee would otherwise
be doing would have to be postponed, done by another employee, or not done at all.”); Mann v.
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required to provide accommodation if doing so would violate a valid
140
141
law or regulation, result in health or safety hazards, violate
142
or
seniority provisions and collective-bargaining agreements,
143
adversely impact coworkers.
In sum, courts tend to interpret section 701(j) of Title VII
narrowly, imposing “a minimally low burden upon the employer [and]
making
most
accommodations
of
religious
employees
144
unreasonable.” Employees are thus pressured to accept any offered
accommodation—even when it does not adequately accommodate
their religious observance—because courts are unwilling to require
145
more of an employer.
In some situations employers may
accommodate their employees’ religious commitments of their own
accord, but it is important to recognize that employers “are under
146
only a very slight legal obligation to do so.”
III. TITLE VII AND THE HAJJ
As demonstrated in Part II, current Title VII jurisprudence
provides employers with a number of methods to avoid
accommodating an employee’s religious obligations. Due to some of
the unique features of the hajj, however, Muslim employees will likely
Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[The employee’s] proposed accommodation that the
Postal Service ‘just do without’ her would have caused the Postal Service to suffer a significant
loss in efficiency.”).
140. See, e.g., Cassano v. Carb, 436 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an employer did
not discriminate against an employee when it fired her for failing to provide her social security
number because accommodating her belief would cause the employer to violate federal law).
141. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that an employer did not violate Title VII when accommodating the employee’s religious belief
would have violated California health and safety standards).
142. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (majority opinion) (“[W]e do not believe that the
duty to accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid
[collective-bargaining] agreement.”).
143. See, e.g., Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f accommodating an
employee’s religious beliefs also causes a ‘real’ and ‘actual’ imposition on co-workers, Title VII
does not require an employer to make such an accommodation.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Brown, 61 F.3d at 655)); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 1982)
(“[The plaintiff’s] characterization of complaints by others as mere grumbling underestimates
the actual imposition on other employees in depriving them of their shift preference at least
partly because they do not adhere to the same religion as [the plaintiff].”).
144. Brierton, supra note 14, at 174.
145. See Engle, supra note 14, at 397 (“[P]laintiffs have generally only succeeded in their
claims (if only by having summary judgments or dismissals reversed) when . . . courts have
determined that the employer made no attempt at accommodation.”).
146. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 7.
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find that Title VII is even less accommodating of this practice than it
is for religious observance generally. First, employers may not even
be obligated to accommodate the hajj, as the hajj lacks a temporal
mandate. Second, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
accommodating the hajj would not impose more than a de minimis
cost on an employer. Thus, Muslims will find little refuge in federal
employment-discrimination law.
147
Muslims are obligated to complete the hajj once in their life,
but the Qur’an does not dictate when a Muslim must do so, only that
148
it must be performed during Dhu al-Hijjah. So long as Muslims
complete the hajj at some point in their lives, they have satisfied their
149
religious obligation. Therefore, a Muslim employee might fail to
establish a prima facie case because there is no temporal mandate to
the hajj; hence, there would be no conflict between employment duty
150
and religious obligation. An employer could argue that the decision
to go on the hajj in any particular year is a matter of personal choice
and not of religious belief, and there is a strong possibility that the
151
argument would prevail.
In the Berkeley case, it appears that the school district would
152
have made this very argument had the case not settled. If the school
district had prevailed at trial, Safoora Khan would have been forced
to wait nearly a decade for the hajj to occur at a time that would not
conflict with the school year. And it is important to recognize that
Khan’s case is somewhat unique: most employees do not have three
months off from work in the summer during which they can partake
in the hajj.

147. AL FAISAL & NASR, supra note 46, at xiv.
148. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
149. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 111.
150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151. Cf. Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellant’s own
testimony confirmed that her decision to pick up the bread on Friday afternoon was simply her
preference and not a religious requirement.”); Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679,
682 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Title VII does not protect secular preferences.”); Loftus v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Mich., No. 08-13397, 2010 WL 1139338, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2010) (holding
that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case where the plaintiff’s “desire to travel to
the Holy Land for six months was based on his personal preference rather than a religious
obligation”).
152. See Consent Decree, supra note 12, at 2 (“The Board of Education denies that it has
discriminated against Ms. Khan on the basis of her religious observance . . . and further
contends that Ms. Khan’s decision to perform the Hajj in December 2008 was a personal choice
of Ms. Khan’s, which it was not required to accommodate . . . .”).
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If, however, a plaintiff can establish that the decision to perform
the hajj in a specific year is a sincerely held religious belief, then that
plaintiff should be able to establish a prima facie case of employment
153
discrimination, even if the belief is idiosyncratic or not widely held.
Assuming that the Muslim plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
employer still has a number of chances to avoid providing
accommodation. The only way to accommodate the hajj is to grant
time off during Dhu al-Hijjah, which leaves the employer and
employee constrained in finding a mutually agreeable solution. It is
quite likely that Muslim employees will have to use most, if not all, of
their accumulated vacation days to complete the hajj, and even that
may not be enough time off. An employer is permitted to offer
unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation under most
154
circumstances,
but the employer would still have to hire a
temporary employee, reschedule current employees and pay overtime
wages, or simply accept lost efficiency from not having that employee
work. But all of these options impose costs that would almost
155
certainly surpass the de minimis threshold. In addition, a risk of
lower morale among employees can be sufficient to constitute undue
156
hardship.
There is some authority that illustrates the difficulty of prevailing
in a Title VII pilgrimage-accommodation lawsuit. In similar
pilgrimage-accommodation cases, many religious employees lost their
Title VII claims because the court in each case determined that
accommodating the pilgrimage would impose an undue hardship on

153. See EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that the
belief or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.”); supra notes 100–101 and
accompanying text. If pressed, Muslim employees should be able to make the argument that
they have a sincerely held, personal, and religious belief that they must partake in the hajj
during the current year. Otherwise the Tiano line of reasoning would defeat every claim a
Muslim could bring under section 701(j). See supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
155. See Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty To Accommodate Employee
Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 513, 547 (1989) (“Because of the per se nature of [the de minimis cost] approach, cost
alternatives are generally no longer available to employees seeking accommodation under Title
VII.”); supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text.
156. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n
employer is not required to adversely impact or infringe on the rights of other employees when
accommodating religious observances.”); Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274
(5th Cir. 2000) (“The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers . . . is sufficient to
constitute an undue hardship.”).
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157

the employer. In the few cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, the
court’s decision generally turned on the employer’s failure to make
158
any attempt to accommodate the religious employee. Indeed, these
cases confirm what is already apparent from other religiousaccommodation cases: so long as employers demonstrate that they
attempted to accommodate their employees and that any further
proposed accommodation would impose more than a de minimis cost,
159
the employer will likely prevail. Muslims will find that they face a
nearly insurmountable task when seeking Title VII accommodation
to complete the hajj. Instead, they will have to rely on an employer’s
goodwill and willingness to provide extended leave to travel to Mecca
or they will be forced to forgo the hajj.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BERKELEY CASE AND THE POTENTIAL
FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
Title VII, as applied, is not particularly accommodating of
religious belief generally, and section 701(j) is of little benefit for
Muslim employees who wish to complete the hajj. Yet calls for
legislative amendment to or Supreme Court action on section 701(j)
160
have been unavailing. Thus, if reasonable accommodation under

157. See, e.g., Firestone Fibers, 515 F.3d at 319 (“Firestone’s inability to completely
accommodate Wise was not the result of a lack of desire, nor was it based on any intent to
discriminate against his religion. Rather, the failure to achieve a total accommodation rests on
the simple fact that Wise’s request for such an extraordinary number of hours exceeded what
could be reasonably accommodated . . . .”); Favero v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp.
1281, 1294 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“The undisputed facts as to the regular, substitute, and other
drivers available and used, and the effect on Huntsville [Independent School District’s]
operations . . . establish a more than de minimis loss of efficiency.”), aff’d, 110 F.3d 793 (5th Cir.
1997); Smith v. United Ref. Co., No. 77-71, 1980 WL 98, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1980) (holding
that an employer was not obligated to accommodate an employee’s request for accommodation
to perform a pilgrimage when “there were no adequate substitutes, either inside or outside [the
employer’s] workforce, who could perform [the employee’s] duties”).
158. See, e.g., EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(reversing a summary-judgment order when the employer made no showing that
accommodating the employee would impose an undue hardship); United States v. Bd. of Trs.,
No. 92 733 WLB, 1995 WL 311336, at *13 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1995) (“[T]he University cannot
deny a request [for accommodation to perform a pilgrimage] based solely on the duration of the
leave requested without analyzing its operational needs and the individual employer/employee
relationship.”).
159. See Engle, supra note 14, at 388 (“[A]bout the only time that plaintiffs consistently win
is when courts find that employers have made no effort to accommodate the employees.
Otherwise, almost any effort seems sufficient.”).
160. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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section 701(j) is to be more than simply an empty promise, a new
means must be found for achieving those ends.
To kick-start the development of a more accommodating and
balanced Title VII doctrine for religious employees of all faiths, the
EEOC and the DOJ should increasingly intervene in private hajjaccommodation cases such as the Berkeley case. As is the case in
other areas of the law in which the executive branch shapes the policy
161
embodied in a statute, the EEOC and DOJ are tasked by statute to
intervene in civil lawsuits when doing so is “of general public
162
importance.”
Here, even if future cases settle, increased
government involvement in hajj-accommodation cases will further the
dual purposes of the government’s enforcement authority under Title
VII “to implement the public interest as well as to bring about more
163
effective enforcement of private rights.” This Part outlines the
benefits of the proposal in Sections A and B. Section C responds to
some of the most pressing and significant objections to such a
proposal.
A. Increased Government Intervention in Hajj-Accommodation
Cases Will More Effectively Vindicate Private Employees’
Requests for Reasonable Accommodation
The EEOC and the DOJ’s involvement in hajj-accommodation
cases will increase individual plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing in a
Title VII claim and protect their right to reasonable accommodation.
Employers know that, with the government’s weight behind hajjaccommodation cases, they are more likely to face the prospect of a
161. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is one example of an executive
agency that often shapes substantive policy through enforcement. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L.
Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 149, 157 (1990) (“Throughout most of its history, the SEC has consistently relied on this
ad hoc enforcement approach to the development of certain regulatory standards.”). President
Obama’s decision to provide temporary relief from prosecution proceedings to immigrants who
entered the country illegally is but another example of the executive branch shaping policy
through enforcement discretion. See generally President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on Immigration at the Rose Garden (June 15, 2012), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration.
Moreover,
congressional inaction in the face of Hardison is not necessarily indicative of acquiescence to the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 701(j). See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
750 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Congress takes no governmental action except by
legislation. . . . ‘Congress’ deliberate acquiescence’ should more appropriately be called
Congress’s failure to express any opinion.” (quoting id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
163. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
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long and drawn-out litigation than they would if the individual
164
employee were to bring a suit. And as the cost of litigation
165
increases, so too does the incentive to settle. Even if the employer
would ultimately prevail on the merits at trial, settling is still a more
attractive alternative if doing so would be less expensive than
166
litigating the case. This is what seems to have happened in the
Berkeley case. Although the school district maintained that it had not
discriminated against Khan, it nonetheless settled because of the high
167
cost of resolving the case through litigation and trial.
Beyond exerting economic pressure on an employer to settle, the
government is a more informed plaintiff than are individual
employees. As a repeat player, the government can amass useful
information from prior settlements that one-shot plaintiffs cannot
168
obtain. This information can be presented to the opposing party and
to the judge as a trend in settlements or to demonstrate the
reasonableness of an employee’s request for accommodation to
169
complete the hajj. Because settlement operates as an “informal
170
system of precedent,” the government can employ past settlement
171
outcomes as bargaining chips in future settlement conferences.

164. See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 53 (4th ed.
2006) (“The government’s endurance and resources for litigation are so great as to make its full
scale conduct of litigation particularly burdensome for even rich and patient private litigants.”
(footnote omitted)).
165. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit
Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 225 (1999) (“[T]he reason
cases settle is because the alternative to settlement is litigation, which is generally quite costly.”
(footnote omitted)).
166. See generally George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An
Economic Analysis, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 163, 165 (1982) (outlining an economic model for
litigants’ decisions to settle or to go to trial).
167. Consent Decree, supra note 12, at 2–3. In the hajj-accommodation case brought by the
EEOC during the Bush administration, the employer also denied any wrongdoing but settled
the case in order to avoid additional expense. Consent Decree, supra note 10, at 2.
168. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 699 (2002).
169. See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 960 (2010) (arguing that prior settlements can exert “peer
pressure” on similar litigation and can frame the normative outlook of a particular claim). In a
survey conducted for the essay, Professor Depoorter finds that 96 percent of litigators agree that
a lawyer must be aware of developments in settlement awards in their area of practice. Id. at
971.
170. Fromm, supra note 168, at 705.
171. According to Professor Depoorter’s survey, 65 percent of lawyers agreed that it is
useful to refer to favorable settlements from similar cases when in front of a judge during a
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Although general information regarding the Berkeley case is
172
and professional
available through traditional media sources
173
networks, the details these sources provide are incomplete. Often,
secondary sources do not provide a complete picture of the
settlement landscape of employment-discrimination cases, focusing
instead on cases that may be outliers or that involve large rewards or
174
novel remedies. As a result of this selective reporting, “[t]he scope,
quality, and utility of information” available to private plaintiffs
175
about individual lawsuits “will vary on a case-by-case basis.” Only
those with firsthand knowledge of a case will understand how the
specific facts, legal issues, and other circumstances of that case
176
unfolded. The Berkeley case was part of a larger effort between the
177
DOJ and the EEOC to coordinate enforcement of Title VII, and
this coordination will allow the federal government to present a
united front in future cases. The religious-accommodation doctrine
178
requires a fact-intensive inquiry, and although a private plaintiff’s
general knowledge of settlement trends from hajj-accommodation
cases might be somewhat persuasive during a settlement conference,
the persuasive effect is likely to be greater when the government can
discuss the factual similarities between the cases in detail. Without a
credible threat of a successful lawsuit—the situation in which Muslim
employees wishing to complete the hajj will find themselves—
employers have little incentive to engage in negotiations to find a
reasonable accommodation. The government’s intervention has the
potential to realign the scales toward a more equal bargaining
position. That is, employees would have the government on their side;
employers would have the unaccommodating Title VII
accommodation doctrine on theirs.
Finally, government intervention in hajj-accommodation cases
can serve an educational function, which has the potential to lead to

settlement conference, and 90 percent said it was helpful to do so during settlement negotiations
with opposing counsel. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 976.
172. E.g., Brachear, supra note 3; Markon, supra note 1.
173. E.g., Andrew Lu, Teacher’s Hajj Lawsuit Against Berkeley School District Settles, THE
CHI. EMP’T LAW BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://chicagoemploymentattorneysblog.com/
2011/10/teacher-hajj-lawsuit-against-berkeley-school-district-settles.html.
174. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 973.
175. Fromm, supra note 168, at 697.
176. Id. at 699.
177. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5.
178. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
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increased accommodation of Muslims’ beliefs and observances in the
future without the need to resort to litigation. Islam remains largely
179
misunderstood by the public, and many people do not appreciate
180
the profound significance of the hajj. For example, while discussing
the Berkeley case during a hearing entitled Protecting the Civil
Rights of American Muslims, Senator Lindsey Graham argued:
If you were a Christian that says I want to go to Rome for three
weeks or I want to go to Jerusalem for three weeks in the middle of
the school year, I would say no. You know, I’m a Christian. I don’t
believe there’s anything in my faith that says that I get three weeks
181
off to observe Easter on any particular year.

The
Senator’s
comments
demonstrate
two
broad
misunderstandings about the hajj. First, the Senator’s analogy
insinuates that the pilgrimage to Mecca is simply a trip or vacation to
a holy site rather that a religious obligation prescribed by the Qur’an.
Second, the comment demonstrates that—possibly because there is
no parallel obligation in Christianity—many Americans do not realize
how important the hajj is for Muslims. Together, these observations
suggest that, without more information, some employers may not see
the need to accommodate their employees.
182
These cases will surely be controversial, but media reports of
situations like the Berkeley case may also help educate the public
183
about the hajj and its importance to Muslims. With targeted
government intervention, the public may begin to understand that the
hajj is a central tenet of Islamic faith and that any inconvenience
employers experience as a result of accommodating their employees

179. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
180. Cf. Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 81 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he occasional
cancellation or postponement of both work-related and personal travel plans, including the
cancellation of plaintiff’s planned trip to Mecca to participate in the Hajj . . . are the type of
employee grievances that can reasonably be expected to arise in every workplace.”).
181. Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims, supra note 9, at 16 (statement of Sen.
Lindsey Graham).
182. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Brachear, supra note 3 (describing the hajj as “one of the most important
requirements of . . . Muslim faith”); Markon, supra note 1 (“[T]he hajj [is] one of the five pillars
of the Islamic faith, which Muslims are obligated to do once.”). On the other hand, this strategy
could backfire. Rather than serving an educational purpose, the government’s involvement in
these cases could lead to a backlash similar to what the country witnessed in the wake of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and SameSex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1505–11 (2006) (summarizing the political and legal backlash of Brown).
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is only temporary. Muslim employees will make a request for time off
to complete the hajj once in their life. An employer who understands
these facts may be willing to make an accommodation rather than
184
bear the cost of litigating a Title VII claim.
In sum, increased governmental involvement in hajjaccommodation cases will effectively vindicate Muslim employees’
rights to reasonable accommodation in several significant ways. First,
the weight of government resources increases the potential for costly
and drawn-out litigation, thereby making settlement a much more
attractive option for employers. Second, as a repeat player, the
government has an informational advantage over one-shot plaintiffs
and will be able to more effectively bargain with employers. Finally,
government involvement will bring increased media exposure, which
has the potential to educate the public about the hajj and to help
employers see the reasonableness of the request for time off so that
litigation can be avoided in the future.
B. Vindicating the Broader Public Interest in Combating
Employment Discrimination Through Hajj-Accommodation
Cases
Increased governmental intervention in hajj-accommodation
cases also serves the public interest in preventing discrimination and
providing more robust accommodation for religious employees
generally, not just for Muslims. In this respect, government
intervention serves as a means to a larger end. Islam is a religion that
185
places a heavy emphasis on practice in addition to belief, and as the
number of Muslims living in the United States grows, there will likely
be increased pressure for Title VII to accommodate those practices.
As Muslims find their practices accommodated, other religious
employees will have precedent to cite to for their own requests.
One-shot plaintiffs are unlikely to be concerned with the larger
implications
of
their
case
on
religious-accommodation
186
jurisprudence; government intervention ensures that the public’s
184. The Berkeley case settled for $75,000, including attorney’s fees. Consent Decree, supra
note 12, at 9–10. The hajj-accommodation case that was brought during the Bush administration
settled for $70,000. Consent Decree, supra note 10, at 4.
185. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 86.
186. See Lederman, supra note 165, at 225–26 (“The parties [to a lawsuit] do not internalize
costs or benefits to third parties. Thus, the potential precedential value of a court decision will
factor into settlement only to the extent that the precedent would have value to one or both
parties to the litigation itself.”).
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187

interest in favorable precedent is accounted for. The government
can choose cases to influence the order in which cases are brought
before a court, potentially affecting the development of a substantive
188
body of precedent. Although employers may prefer to fight each
claim to establish favorable precedent, the cost of doing so will likely
exceed the cost of settlement when the government is on the other
189
side of the “v.” The government’s intervention, then, may keep
cases from reaching trial.
But settlements do not take place in a vacuum. Though many
190
agree that past judicial precedent affects settlement outcomes, some
commentators argue that “the supposed strict division between the
private realm of settlement agreements and the public forum of trial
191
outcomes is naive.” When a hajj-accommodation case settles, the
outcome of that settlement may extend beyond the individual
192
settlement agreement to affect future litigation. As Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow explains:
[Settlement reports] are used by practicing lawyers to guide their
demands, settlements, and litigation decisions just as reported
decisions do. These reports may not include . . . elaborated legal
reasoning . . . but they provide at least as much guidance as jury
verdicts and unreported judicial decisions. . . . [A]s cases of
significant public importance are covered in the news, both the
precedential and publicity effects of settlements may well exceed
those of reported decisions, and the public . . . may be more

187. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 982 n.98 (“[T]he collective action perspective on the
evolution of law . . . postulates that areas of law expand more rapidly if plaintiffs are supported
by the presence of long-term stakeholders . . . .”).
188. See Lederman, supra note 165, at 234 (“Precedent is . . . ‘path-dependent’: the order in
which cases are presented to a court for decision can influence the substantive content of
precedent.”).
189. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 981 (“In the absence of effective coordination,
defendants cannot take into account the costs that their own settlement imposes on similarly
situated companies. . . . Future defendants would rather see a novel claim fought off, but when
individually faced with a claim, they prefer to settle the dispute . . . .”).
190. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2680 (1995) (“To charge
that settlement is ungoverned by precedent is to be grossly insensitive to the contexts in which
settlements occur.”).
191. E.g., Depoorter, supra note 169, at 973.
192. See id. at 979 (“[T]he outcome of a settlement may reach beyond the individual
settlement agreement and affect adjudication.”).
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informed than if precedents were left totally to lawyer access and
193
interpretation.

Even though settlement lacks formal binding power on future
194
parties, it can still influence the development of law. Settlement
outcomes will affect future settlement and litigation decisions because
past settlement precedent can make a claim seem more reasonable
195
and less novel. Past settlement concessions can create a pressure
toward future concessions, and that pressure will likely be spread
196
across all employers.
Lawyers may not be the only ones who will use settlement
information to shape future decisions. Due to the increased
involvement of judges in settlement proceedings, prior settlements
can become a “benchmark or reference point” for judges when
197
deciding the merits of similar cases in the future. Additionally,
media coverage of lawsuits tends to affect future jury decisions and
198
awards, and it is quite possible that media coverage of settlements
199
will influence jurors’ perceptions of employment discrimination.
The public may begin to readjust the normative lens through which
future religious-accommodation suits are litigated despite the fact

193. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 190, at 2681.
194. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 974.
195. Id. at 987.
196. Id. at 981.
197. Id. at 975. Judges can use their experience and personal relationships to remain
knowledgeable of novel settlements and trends. As Professor Depoorter explains:
Judges . . . may interpret settlement precedents as expressive statements regarding
the appropriateness of compensation. Once a novel legal claim for tort compensation
has been gratified by a (presumed) concession of the same sort in a private settlement
agreement, future claims will be perceived as less extraordinary. If a company refuses
to accept an offer that is comparable to concessions that competitors made in prior
settlements, judges might be less sympathetic to that firm in subsequent proceedings.
Id. at 976.
198. See Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil
Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 816–17 (1991) (finding a
positive correlation between mock jury damage awards and the frequency of large awards in
other cases, suggesting that jurors are influenced by media coverage and use media coverage as
a benchmark); Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 260
(2004) (“Through repeated and patterned reading of [media] coverage [of employment
discrimination complaints], individuals come to possess cultural knowledge about the law.”).
199. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 978 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that information on
settlements will likewise influence attitudes of jurors and their perceptions of right and wrong.
As such, information on settlements will influence the viewpoints of juries . . . .”).
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that settlements do not formally bind future parties. Because of the
feedback effect of past settlements, the legal community and the
public will begin to view these claims as legitimate. In addition,
because the government is able to selectively pursue Title VII claims,
the government’s involvement could serve as a signal that a particular
case has more merit than if the individual employee sued the
201
employer. Thus, when an employer finally does challenge an
202
employee’s hajj-accommodation case, it will be too late. As past
settlements are employed in future litigation, the coverage of the
settlements will affect the public’s perception of reasonable
accommodation. The government’s involvement may thereby shift
the normative view of what constitutes more than de minimis cost,
and religious employees will be able to have their beliefs and
practices more readily accommodated.
Title VII should not be used simply as an ex post method of
punishing employers for failing to accommodate their employees.
Instead, the prospect of Title VII litigation should incentivize
employers to cooperate with their employees to find a reasonable
accommodation prior to the filing of charges with the EEOC. For
instance, the two parties could agree that unpaid leave is an
appropriate balance between a Muslim’s need to complete a
fundamental religious obligation and an employer’s need to avoid
200. See id. at 976 (“Given their noncoercive nature, settlement agreements may be
perceived in a normative light.”).
201. The EEOC and the DOJ may have an institutional interest in maintaining their
credibility before the courts because of their status as repeat players. See Brianne J. Gorod,
Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201,
1245 (2012) (“Whatever obligations government lawyers may have to their client, the United
States, they also ‘have an obligation to see that justice is done.’ This special obligation carries
with it both responsibilities and rewards: the responsibility to temper zealous advocacy with a
commitment to the right outcome and the concomitant reward of special respect from the
courts.” (citation omitted) (quoting W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and
the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1349 (2009))). Moreover, a court’s awareness of
the government’s interest in maintaining credibility could affect the way a court views the case.
See S. REP. NO. 96-416, at 23 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 805 (stating, in the
context of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997j (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)), that the
“Justice Department brings credibility to the proceedings,” as “[t]he mere presence of the
Department alerts a court that conditions . . . are sufficiently serious to warrant the attention of
the Attorney General”).
202. Cf. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 976–77 (“When the judge considers these standards in
settlement conferences, bench trials, or remittitur, he or she might perceive this as enforcing an
industry norm, instead of introducing novel changes to existing law. In this sense, settlement
conferences are an opportunity for judges to reinforce settlement norms and standards.”
(citation omitted)).
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incurring extensive costs. In fact, allowing a Muslim employee to take
unpaid leave is probably the most reasonable method of
accommodating the competing interests of the employer and the
employee. Under Hardison and subsequent cases, however, an
employer can simply decline to offer any accommodation because
even this sensible accommodation would impose more than a de
203
minimis cost.
204
So long as employers know that Title VII requires so little,
section 701(j) cannot provide the incentive to find solutions to
conflicts between employment duties and employees’ religious
205
beliefs. Insofar as parties operate and bargain in the shadow of the
law, Title VII casts a decidedly small shadow on employers. Hajjaccommodation cases such as the Berkeley case present an entry
point for effecting change because they can demonstrate to employers
that the federal government believes that Title VII actually does
require accommodation of employees’ religious practices. Beyond
protecting private plaintiffs, the EEOC and the DOJ have an
obligation to vindicate the public interest; they “should not sit on the
206
sidelines as courts apply the law and establish precedent.” By
207
intervening in future cases, the government can fulfill its twin roles
and begin to realign the scales toward reasonable accommodation.
Once that happens, the government can reduce its involvement
because section 701(j) will provide a stronger ex ante incentive to
accommodate.
If increased government involvement in Title VII creates
favorable precedent for Muslim employees wishing to complete the
hajj, other religious employees stand to benefit as well. Non-Muslim
employees can use precedent from hajj-accommodation cases to show
the reasonableness of their own religious-accommodation claims.
Islam is a religion with many requirements and obligations, and many
of these practices create conflicts that will impose more than a de
203. See supra Part II.
204. See supra note 145; see also supra Part II.
205. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 327 (1991) (“[L]itigants
order their private, out-of-court negotiations around the substantive law and procedure that will
be applied if the negotiations break down and the court steps out of the shadows to adjudicate
the dispute.”). To the extent that employers know that they will not be held liable under the
substantive law, there is little incentive to negotiate a suitable accommodation for employees.
206. Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
211, 234 (2008).
207. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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minimis cost on employers, as the term is currently understood. But if
there is precedent for accommodating these practices, then less
burdensome accommodations proposed by other religious employees
are more likely to be accommodated as well. Although the Supreme
Court’s definition of “undue hardship” may remain the same,
government intervention in Title VII litigation has the potential to
breathe new life into section 701(j).
C. A Response to Potential Objections
Of course, a proposal for increased governmental involvement in
private hajj-accommodation cases is likely to raise more than a few
objections. This Note will respond to three here: (1) employers should
not be forced to accommodate every religious belief and practice, (2)
the government should not shape the course of religiousaccommodation doctrine through litigation, and (3) even if the
government should, it should not litigate on behalf of a particular
religion.
1. How far is too far? The language of Title VII is clear and
sensible: employers are not required to accommodate an employee’s
208
religious practice if doing so would impose an undue hardship.
There are costs that employers cannot—and should not—be expected
to bear. But by equating undue hardship with de minimis cost, the
209
Supreme Court “effectively nullif[ied]” section 701(j).
The law is full of difficult balancing tests, and the courts have
shown themselves to be capable of “distinguish[ing] between real
210
threat and mere shadow.” Although it may be difficult in certain
situations, judges are required to engage in the “hard task of
211
judging,” and they must fairly consider the important competing
212
values at stake in religious-accommodation cases. Concededly,
government intervention risks swinging the pendulum too far in the
other direction, but there is a point at which the government could
temper its intervention. It is not the aim of this Note to suggest that
the government should intervene in every hajj-accommodation case—
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
209. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
211. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
212. See id. (“When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither can provide
the definitive answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing.”).
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or even most cases. Nor does this Note advocate for an absolute
obligation to accommodate religious employees. Instead, this Note
proposes a means to achieving a more robust and balanced
accommodation doctrine, one in which courts actually balance the
competing interests, rather than summarily dismissing the concerns of
religious employees by rubber-stamping an employer’s decision.
Although the slippery-slope objection is a fair one, it cuts both ways.
Hardison and subsequent cases demonstrate what happens when the
law strays too far in the other direction.
The First Amendment serves as a natural backstop for this
Note’s proposal because the government cannot impose an absolute
obligation on employers to accommodate their employees’ religious
213
practices. Title VII does not purport to establish a religion or to
mandate absolute accommodation. Rather, its prohibition of
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin has the secular purpose of ensuring employment
214
opportunity to all groups in society. As Justice O’Connor observed,
“Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation
and extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and
practices . . . an objective observer would perceive it as an antidiscrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a
215
particular religious practice.” The government’s intervention is an
attempt to restore that spirit of reasonable accommodation such that
section 701(j) can have some import in future accommodation cases
and can—like the prohibition of employment discrimination based on
race, color, sex, and national origin—provide employment
opportunities for members of all faiths.
Furthermore, accommodating the hajj is in some ways less
burdensome than other accommodations that employers are required
by law to make. For instance, an employer who accommodates a
Sabbatarian pursuant to Title VII loses that employee for fifty-two
213. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (“[T]he Connecticut
statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on
their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). One commentator
suggests that the Court’s decision in Hardison was motivated by a “concern that a more
burdensome accommodation requirement would violate the Establishment Clause.” Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992). Professor McConnell concludes, however, that “[t]his cannot be
the constitutional test; most accommodations that have been recognized as legitimate impose
more than a de minimis burden on others.” Id.
214. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
215. Id. (emphasis added).
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days out of the year, every year. An employee who takes advantage
216
of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 is eligible for up to
217
twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year a child is born or adopted.
Muslims who wish to complete the hajj, by contrast, will only need
about three weeks of leave, once in their life. All of this is not to say
that accommodating the hajj will not impose costs on an employer,
but the hajj is not necessarily unique in that employees must take
time off from work. Certainly there will be cases in which the cost of
accommodating the hajj will be significant, and in those cases,
accommodation may be impossible. But Hardison and subsequent
cases dictate that almost any cost, significant or otherwise, is sufficient
to deny accommodation. A more balanced approach is needed.
2. It Is Not the Government’s Place To Shape the Course of Title
VII Accommodation Through Litigation. First, there is a pragmatic
answer to this objection that probably begs the question: nothing else
has worked. Though commentators deride the Court’s decision in
218
Hardison, the fact remains that the Court has not overturned its
holding. Similar cries for legislative amendment to Title VII have
proved fruitless.
It is not as if Congress is unaware of the impact that Hardison
and subsequent cases have had on religious accommodation. At least
one chamber of Congress has considered the Workplace Religious
Freedom Act (WFRA)––a piece of legislation specifically aimed at
219
amending section 701(j) of Title VII—in every session since 1994.
The 2012 incarnation of the WFRA specifically finds that the Court’s
220
holding in Hardison is “contrary to the intent of Congress.” But the
WFRA has never passed through a chamber of Congress. In fact, it

216. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.).
217. Id. § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
218. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
219. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong.
(2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000);
S. 1668, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2071,
104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 4117, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (1994).
220. S. 3686 § 2. The WFRA redefines undue hardship to include only those
accommodations that “impose[] a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of the
employer’s business.” Id. § 4 (emphasis added). This definition of undue hardship is similar to
the one contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I,
§ 101(10), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2006)).
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221

has never made it out of committee. And as Congress failed to
restore section 701(j) to its intended purpose, the number of claims of
religious discrimination filed with the EEOC more than doubled
between 1992 and 2007, and “there is no way to tell how many people
222
simply quit their job rather than complain.” If minority religions are
to be protected, legislative amendment is not a promising route.
A more nuanced answer must acknowledge that the discussion
about a framing effect of settlement and its impact on future cases is
speculative. It may very well be the case that even if the government
settles twenty hajj-accommodation cases, a district court will throw
out the first case to reach trial on summary judgment, and an
appellate court will affirm the decision. That rejection would create
unfavorable precedent, which would negatively impact future cases
for Muslims and religious employees generally. But this point circles
back to the first answer: nothing else has worked. Waiting for the
Court to reexamine Hardison or for Congress to amend section 701(j)
means that religious employees have to accept an unaccommodating
religious-accommodation jurisprudence. If this Note’s proposed
strategy does not work, and Title VII does not impose a duty to
accommodate one of the Five Pillars of Islam, then section 701(j)
truly has become a statute that “while brimming with sound and fury,
223
ultimately signif[ies] nothing.”
3. The Government Should Not Litigate on Behalf of a Particular
Religion. Government intervention on behalf of a particular religion
in the context of Title VII is not unprecedented. Indeed, the EEOC
and the DOJ have filed numerous religious-accommodation lawsuits
224
on behalf of Worldwide Church of God members. Just as other
agencies of the executive branch have enforcement discretion in other
225
areas of law, the EEOC and the DOJ have discretion in whether

221. See, e.g., S. 3686 (112th): Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3686 (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
222. 156 CONG. REC. S10,517 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
223. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Eugene Volokh, “Department of Justice Enforces the Sharia: Sues Illinois School
District for Muslim Teacher Hajj,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://
volokh.com/2010/12/14/department-of-justice-enforces-the-sharia-sues-illinois-school-districtfor-muslim-teacher-hajj (citing those cases).
225. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A principal feature of
the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.”); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains
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and how to enforce Title VII. The government is tasked with
ensuring effective enforcement of employees’ Title VII rights, and the
hajj presents an opportune point of entry for government
intervention. But the intervention is not just about obtaining
accommodation for Muslims; it is about restoring some semblance of
reasonableness to section 701(j).
Although the immediate impact of this strategy benefits
Muslims, other religious employees will benefit from these cases as
227
well. Many of the requirements of Islam actually impose more than
a de minimis cost on employers, but these cases may begin to shift the
normative framework through which reasonable accommodation is
applied. Government involvement will likely be controversial; it was
in the Berkeley case. The long-term effect of these cases, however,
will lead to increased accommodation for religious employees of all
faiths.
CONCLUSION
The Berkeley case demonstrates the need for a shift in the way
that the Title VII religious-accommodation doctrine is applied. The
hajj is a central tenet of Islam, yet the Berkeley school district
probably would have mounted a successful defense against Safoora
Khan’s claim of religious discrimination but for the DOJ’s
involvement. Indeed, the hajj will almost always impose more than a
de minimis cost on employers, and in those situations Title VII will
provide no protection for Muslim employees. Muslims wishing to
complete the hajj will be forced to choose between their faith and
their job, the exact choice that Senator Randolph hoped to eliminate
228
when he proposed section 701(j).
In this regard, this Note joins the commentary on the failure of
Title VII to fulfill its promise of reasonable accommodation for
religious belief and practice. The standard articulated in Hardison
and applied in subsequent cases—which equates undue hardship with
more than a de minimis cost—is contrary to the spirit of section

‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
380 n.11 (1982))).
226. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 458 (6th Cir. 1999); cf. Kennedy,
supra note 206, at 232 (arguing that the president assuming office after George W. Bush should
establish new enforcement priorities within the DOJ Civil Rights Division).
227. See supra Part IV.B.
228. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

MOONEY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1068

1/17/2013 4:41 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
229

[Vol. 62:1029

701(j). Unlike previous commentary, however, this Note attempts to
articulate a workable strategy that can begin to tip the scales so that
the interests of employees and employers are fairly balanced.
Hardison was decided in 1977—more than twenty-five years ago—
and the Court has not seen fit to reexamine its holding since then.
Despite repeated attempts by members of Congress, the WFRA has
never made it out of committee. With two branches of the
government unwilling or unable to act, the path to more effective
accommodation must begin from another source—the third,
remaining branch.
The EEOC and the DOJ have a clear mandate from Congress to
230
enforce Title VII, and action taken on behalf of individuals also
231
furthers the public interest. Increased intervention by the EEOC
and the DOJ in future hajj-accommodation cases has the potential to
be the solution to the vexing problem of providing reasonable
accommodation––for Muslims as well as for religious employees
generally. In the short term, these interventions benefit the individual
plaintiffs seeking accommodation because employers are more likely
to settle when the government is involved in the case. But these
settlements have value outside of the immediate lawsuit. Over time,
hajj-accommodation cases can begin to adjust the lens through which
the courts and the public view reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship. Courts may begin to evaluate undue hardship consistent
with congressional intent and the plain language of section 701(j).
Employees can use information about past settlements in future
negotiations to demonstrate the reasonableness of their proposed
accommodation. Title VII will finally be able to create an incentive
for employers to cooperate with their employees in working to
resolve conflicts between employment duties and religious practices
prior to litigation. Religious employees will finally have a legitimate
opportunity to benefit from the protections promised by section
701(j), and the government will help to restore the spirit of
reasonable accommodation.

229. See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
231. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).

